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Digital signature scheme is commonly employed in modern electronic commerce and quantum
digital signature (QDS) offers the information-theoretical security by the laws of quantum mechanics
against attackers with unreasonable computation resources. The focus of previous QDS was on the
signature of 1-bit message. In contrast, based on quantum ghost imaging with security test, we
propose a scheme of QDS in which a multi-bit message can be signed at a time. Our protocol is no
more demanding than the traditional cases for the requirements of quantum resources and classical
communications. The multi-bit protocol could simplify the procedure of QDS for long messages in
practical applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures aim to guarantee the authenticity
and transferability of signed messages in modern digi-
tal communications. The classical protocols of digital
signatures commonly employ the public-key encryption
and provide the computational-assumption security for
legitimate users. For example, the security of the fa-
mous Rivest-Shamir-Adleman protocol [1] is based on the
reasonable capabilities in the computation of factorizing
large integers, and such security is susceptible to algorith-
mic breakthroughs, large-scale computational resources
and the emerging technologies of quantum computation
[2-4]. In contrast, quantum digital signature (QDS),
which was firstly proposed in 2001 [5], is robust against
attackers with unrestricted capabilities in the computa-
tion, since QDS offers the information-theoretical secu-
rity by fundamental principles of quantum mechanics.
The early versions of QDS [5,6] required the quantum
memory for the interval between the distribution stage
of quantum signature and the messaging stage, which
is unfeasible in practical applications because of the im-
mature technologies of quantum memory [7,8]. Later,
this demanding requirement was removed by using un-
ambiguous state elimination for quantum states and only
storing classical outcomes for the messaging stage [9,10].
Wallden et al. furthermore presented QDS protocols [11]
requiring only the same technical components as quan-
tum key distribution (QKD), which has been greatly de-
veloped over the past two decades [12,13]. Such break-
throughs motivated several notable advances in experi-
mental demonstrations of QDS [14], where the transmis-
sion distance has been remarkably extended by utilizing
phase-encoded states [15-17] and polarization-encoded
states [18-20] in recent years. Additionally, several pro-
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posals have been implemented for improving the security
of QDS, such as measurement-device-independent (MDI)
QDS [21,22], which is immune to detector side-channel
attacks, and passive decoy-state QDS for circumventing
the leakage of the signal and decoy information to at-
tackers [23]. However, those QDS protocols were dealing
with the case of one-bit signature and the iterations of
the procedure would be considerable for longer messages,
limiting the feasibility in practical applications.
In this work, we propose and experimentally demon-
strate a scheme of QDS in which the multi-bit message
can be signed at a time. The multi-bit QDS protocol
could markedly simplify the signature procedure for long
messages in comparison with previous one-bit QDS. This
work is inspired by ghost imaging in time domain [24-
27] developed over the last several years. Ghost imag-
ing is an intriguing technique of indirect imaging by
the correlation of two beams. In a typical scheme of
ghost imaging, one beam (so-called test beam) passing
through the object is collected by the bucket detector
without spatial resolution, while the multi-pixel detec-
tor which can image the object is placed in another spa-
tially separated beam (reference beam). The first ghost
imaging experiment was realized by the spatial correla-
tion of photon pairs generated by spontaneous paramet-
ric down conversion (SPDC) in nonlinear crystals [28].
Thereafter, ghost imaging has been rapidly developed
from quantum to classical to computational [29-31] with
schemes of thermal-source ghost imaging [29], computa-
tional ghost imaging [30] and compressive ghost imaging
[31]. Recently, Ryczkowski et al. demonstrated a thermal
ghost imaging scheme in time domain with an all-fiber
setup [24]. Meanwhile, Zhang’s group also realized quan-
tum temporal ghost imaging and quantum secure ghost
imaging over optical fibers of 50 km by utilizing time-
frequency entanglement of photon pairs [26,27], since this
entanglement can be well maintained during the distribu-
tion of photon pairs over optical fibers. Quantum ghost
imaging process can be treated as the transfer of multi-bit
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2information between legal parties and suitable security
test over the quantum channel can limit the attacker’s
knowledge on the imaging information, which can be ap-
plied in scenarios of quantum communications [27].
In this paper, we will firstly introduce the principle of
quantum temporal ghost imaging based on time correla-
tion of photon pairs, and then present the protocol and
experimental demonstration of multi-bit QDS, in which
the multi-bit message is signed by the way of ghost imag-
ing. The multi-bit scheme would promote QDS toward
practical applications by reducing the iteration of the sig-
nature procedure.
II. QUANTUM TEMPORAL GHOST IMAGING
Fig. 1(a) illustrates the typical scheme of quantum
temporal ghost imaging. In this scheme, Energy-time en-
tangled photon pairs are generated by the quantum light
source placed at Alice. She keeps signal photons and
sends idler photons to Bob over the quantum channel.
At Alices side, signal photons pass through an intensity
modulator followed by a single photon detector (SPD).
The temporal object is the repeated time-varying pattern
carried by the modulator. Similar to the temporal ghost
imaging scheme in Ref. [24], Alices detector has low res-
olution in time domain and therefore, it cannot image
the temporal object. The resolution of Alices detector
is equal to the repeated patterns period T . However,
Bobs detector has high resolution and it can effectively
image the temporal object placed at Alices side. The
timing clocks of the two SPDs are synchronized and the
measurement time is equally divided into many frames
(Fig. 1(b)). Here the frame size is equal to the period
of the temporal pattern T . Hence, Alice only knows the
frames in which her detector collects signal photons, and
she has no knowledge of the precise timing information
of single photon events due to the low resolution of her
SPD. On the other hand, Bobs high-resolution SPD can
record the precise arrival times of idler photons. After
the measurement of millions of single photon events at
both sides, Alice sends the frame numbers, labelled as
Aframe, to Bob by the classical channel. Then, Bob sifts
his photon records Brecord by keeping the records of pho-
tons in the same frames as Aframe and discarding others.
Since the signal and idler photons of a pair are gener-
ated simultaneously from the entanglement source, the
sifting operation with Aframe actually informs Bob how
the temporal pattern by the intensity modulator selects
Alices photons. After the sifting, Bob could retrieve the
pattern by making the statistics of photons positions in
the corresponding frames. From the view of quantum
ghost imaging, Aframe are the outputs of the bucket detec-
tor without temporal resolution in the test beam, while
Bobs precise timing information Brecord are recorded by
the detector with high resolution in the reference beam.
Neither Aframe nor Brecord can singly retrieves the tem-
poral pattern. On the other hand, from the view of com-
FIG. 1. (a) The sketch of quantum temporal ghost imaging;
(b) Alice and Bob record the photons’ arrival times and the
corresponding frame numbers. SPD, single photon detector;
QC, quantum channel.
munications, Alice transmits the pattern information to
Bob by the method of quantum ghost imaging. There-
fore, the physical implementation of the intensity mod-
ulator can be equivalently replaced by the single photon
event selection according to the repeated temporal pat-
tern in Alices data processing, as illustrated in Fig. 1(c).
In detail, at Alices side, signal photons are directly de-
tected by a high-resolution detector and photons arrival
times are precisely recorded. After the measurement, Al-
ice selects the photon records according to a specific re-
peated pattern, which is the temporal object at Alices
side. Then, Alice still sends the corresponding frame
numbers Aframe to Bob through the classical channel.
Obviously, for Bob and any other party, there is no dif-
ference between the typical scheme (Fig. 1(a)) and the
modified scheme (Fig. 1(c)). In this paper, the modi-
fied scheme is adopted in the QDS protocol for its easier
implementation comparing with the typical scheme with
an intensity modulator. As mentioned above, quantum
ghost imaging is based on the correlation measurement
of two separate beam, hence, this technique actually re-
alizes the transmission of the object information from
Alice (test beam) towards Bob (reference beam). Fur-
thermore, quantum temporal ghost imaging is based on
photon pairs with energy-time entanglement. A part of
entangled photon pairs could be utilized to monitor the
security of the quantum channel in the imaging process
[27]. Hence, quantum temporal ghost imaging can be
applied as a new approach in quantum secure communi-
cations.
For reducing the background noise of temporal ghost
imaging, we adopt the approach of large-alphabet QKD
encoding [32] in which the photons’ arrival times are en-
3FIG. 2. Three-layer encoding in ghost imaging
coded by three layers. A frame contains several time slots
and a slot consists of a few bins. For the photon record
in Fig. 2, its frame number is 1, slot number is 1 and bin
number is 4. In ghost imaging, the period of the binary
pattern is as large as the frame size and the bit size of
the pattern is the same as the slot size. The pattern dis-
played in Fig. 2 is 1001 and the four-bit message can be
transferred from Alice to Bob by ghost imaging. To be
specific, Alice and Bob firstly make the frame and bin
sifting to reduce the effect of noise photons and detec-
tor jitter. The two parties publicly announce the pho-
tons’ frame numbers and bin numbers, only keeping the
records of those photons with same frame and bin num-
bers and discarding other records. Then, Alice utilizes
the temporal pattern to select her single photon records
and sends the corresponding frame numbers to Bob. The
multi-bit message can be retrieved at Bob’s side by the
correlation of Alice’s frame numbers and Bob’s precise
records.
In the three-layer encoding mechanism, Alice and Bob
don’t announce the slot numbers in the classical commu-
nication for ghost imaging, and the third party cannot
eavesdrop the multi-bit message over the classical chan-
nel since the slot layer conveys the information of the
temporal pattern. Furthermore, the security of quantum
channel (Fig. 1(b)) can be checked by the measurement
of time-energy entanglement quality [32,33] or the proto-
col of nonlocal dispersion cancellation [34,35]. The upper
bound of the eavesdropping fraction indicates the leak-
age of Bob’s slot information and determines the security
level of QDS protocol based on ghost imaging, which will
be discussed in the following sections.
III. PROTOCOL OF MULTI-BIT QUANTUM
DIGITAL SIGNATURE
There are generally three parties in the model of QDS
wherein Alice signed the message and Bob (Charlie) are
recipients. Fig. 3 illustrates the basic scheme of multi-
bit QDS. Alice holds the entanglement source and keeps
the signal photons of entangled pairs. Idler photons
pass through a beam splitter and are distributed to Bob
and Charlie over quantum channels. There are pairwise
authenticated classical channels between Alice and Bob
(Charlie), which can be realized with short preshared
keys [36]. Additionally, there is a secure classical channel
between Bob and Charlie, which can be guaranteed by
the state-of-the-art technology of QKD. In QDS, Alice
sends the message with her signature to Bob and Bob
forwards the message to Charlie if he accepts it. QDS
should be immune to Alice’s repudiation and Bob’s forg-
ing. A successful repudiation by Alice means Bob accepts
the message but Charlie rejects it.
Similar to previous QDS, the multi-bit QDS has two
stages: distribution stage and messaging stage. In the
former stage, the quantum states are distributed to the
parties and measured by them, while the latter stage cor-
responds to the transmission of the signed message by the
classical communication.
Basically, there are five steps in the distribution stage
of the proposed protocol.
(1) Alice, Bob and Charlie implement the clock syn-
chronization, and announce the sizes of time frame, slot
and bin.
(2) The three parties measure the single photons,
recording the arrival times of photons and the corre-
sponding frame, slot and bin numbers.
(3) Alice and Bob (Charlie) publish part of records
to estimate the error rate of slot encoding and the up-
per bound of the eavesdropping fraction χAB (χAC) over
the quantum channel X (Y ). A successful forging of
the signed message is closely related to the considerable
eavesdropping on photons toward the recipients of the
signature, i.e., Bob and Charlie. Suitable security check
can be utilized to monitor the quantum channel [32-35]
and the success probability of the malicious forging ex-
ponentially increases as the eavesdropping fraction in-
creases [15,16].
(4) Alice and Bob announce the frame and bin numbers
of the remaining photon records. They keep the records
of photons in the same frames and bins, discarding other
records. Then, Alice’s records are labelled as XA and
Bob’s records as XB since their records correspond to the
quantum channel X. The records here only contain the
frame numbers and slot numbers of photons. Similarly,
Alice and Charlie also make the frame and bin sifting.
After the sifting, Alice’s records are labelled as Y A and
Charlie’s records as Y C by quantum channel Y .
(5) Bob and Charlie secretly and randomly exchange
half of photon records with each other to make the
records symmetric from Alice’s view. The secret ex-
change can be guaranteed by the classical secure chan-
nel between Bob and Charlie based on QKD technology.
Similar to previous QDS, this step is to prevent Alice’s
repudiation. After the distribution stage, Bob has the
records SB = (XBkeep, Y
C
forward), whereinX
B
keep are the half
of records Bob keeps in the secret exchange and Y Cforward
are the records forwarded from Charlie. Also, Charlie’s
records are denoted as SC = (XBforward, Y
C
keep). Alice’s
records are SA = (XA, Y A).
The messaging stage is the classical communication,
4FIG. 3. The setting of multi-bit QDS. Alice holds the entan-
glement source and keeps signal photons, while idler photons
are randomly directed to Bob and Charlie by a beam splitter.
which could occur much later. There are three steps in
this stage.
(6) Alice randomly keeps half the records SA =
(XA, Y A) and discards others. Thereafter, Alice chooses
the records with specific slot numbers according to the
message to be signed, and then sends the frame numbers
of those records she chooses to Bob through the classi-
cal channel. Here the frame numbers are the signature
elements, denoted as Sigframe. If a frame consists of M
slots, M-bit signed message has been transmitted.
(7) When Bob receives the frame numbers Sigframe,
he can retrieve the M-bit signed message by the tem-
poral ghost imaging, as discussed in Section I. Bob has
two record blocks XBkeep and Y
C
forward, and hence he can
perform ghost imaging twice. The first ghost imaging is
realized by XBkeep and Sigframe, and the second one is by
Y Cforward and Sigframe. The noise of ghost imaging is due
to system error rate, which includes setup imperfection
and the eavesdropping perturbation over the quantum
channel, and the forging of signature numbers Sigframe.
The low leakage of slot information would lead to a high
noise of ghost imaging in case of forging the frame num-
bers and vice versa. If both of the noise factors in the
two ghost images, defined as the inverse of signal-to-noise
ratio, are lower than the acceptance threshold ThBaccept,
Bob will accept the message and forwards it to Charlie
through the classical channel. The noise factor here is
similar to the concept of mismatch in previous QDS [15-
23] where Bob checks Alice’s raw keys to decide whether
he accepts the message or not.
(8) Similarly, Charlie uses his records XBforward and
Y Ckeep to perform ghost imaging twice with the forwarded
signature elements Sigframe. Also, if both of the noise
factors in the two images are lower than the verification
threshold ThCverify, Charlie will accept the message. It
should be noted that Charlie’s threshold is higher than
Bob’s, i.e., ThBaccept < Th
C
verify, to prevent Alice’s repu-
diation.
It’s worth noting that in our protocol two special cases
should be avoided: all bits of the signed message are 1 or
0, since Bob could easily forge any message to be 1111 or
0000 according to the frame sifting of Alice and Charlie
in the classical channel.
IV. PROOF-OF-PRINCIPLE DEMONSTRATION
The experimental setup of multi-bit QDS is shown as
Fig. 4. A continuous-wave laser with center- wavelength
of 1552.52 nm pumps a piece of dispersion shifted fiber
(DSF) to generate time-energy entangled photon pairs by
the spontaneous four-wave mixing process. The length of
DSF is about 200 meters and it is cooled at about 40 K in
the Gifford-Mcmahon cryocooler for suppressing Raman
noise photons. The generated photon pairs are filtered by
a dense wavelength division multiplexer (DWDM) with
center-wavelength of 1549.32 nm and bandwidth of 50
GHz. The signal photons are collected by Alice, while
the reflected photons pass through the 50:50 coupler and
are distributed to Bob and Charlie. At Bob side, he uses
another DWDM with center-wavelength of 1555.72 nm
and bandwidth of 50 GHz to collect the idler photons.
Charlie’s setup is identical to Bob’s and therefore is not
shown in detail. The fiber distance between Alice and
Bob (Charlie) is a few meters. For the three parties, they
all directly detect half the daughter photons to estimate
the channel error rate and perform the digital signature
based on ghost imaging, while the other half of photons at
each side pass through the positive (negative) dispersion
module to estimate the security of quantum channel by
the nonlocal dispersion cancellation [34,35,37]. The pos-
itive (negative) dispersion module (DCMCB, Proximion
Corp.) is based on the fiber Bragg grating with group ve-
locity dispersion of 1981 (-1980) ps/nm at 1545nm. The
detection efficiencies of superconducting nanowire single
photon detectors (SNSPD) are ∼50% with dark count
rates of ∼100 Hz, timing jitters of ∼80 ps and maximum
count rates of ∼2 MHz [38]. The coincidence measure-
ments of the single photon events are realized by a time-
to-digital converter (TDC) modules (Hydra Harp 400,
Pico Quant). The full width at half maximum (FWHM)
of the coincidence peak between SNSPD1 and SNSPD3 is
128 ps, while coincidence between SNSPD2 and SNSPD3
manifests the large dispersion effect with the FWHM of
896 ps. The peak of nonlocal dispersion cancellation
is 160 ps by the coincidence measurement of SNSPD2
and SNSPD4. The eavesdropping of the collective-attack
level on photons’ timing information would be indicated
by the nonlocal dispersion cancellation [34,35].
In the experiment, the photons’ timing information
are encoded by the three-layer mechanism as shown in
Fig. 3. Considering the filtering bandwidth of photon
pairs is 50 GHz, the size of bin is set as 20 ps, simi-
lar to Ref. [34]. In detail, a time slot contains 15 bins
and a frame consists of 10 slots. Therefore, the size of
the frame is 3 ns. Taking into account of the single count
rate of Alice’s detector SNSPD1 as 1.5 MHz, there is
basically no more than one photon in each frame and
multi-photon records are discarded. In the step (5) of dis-
tribution stage, Bob and Charlie secretly and randomly
5FIG. 4. Experimetal setup. The time-energy entangled photon pairs are generated in the cooling dispersion shifted fiber
(DSF). Alice holds the quantum source and keeps the signal photons of pairs, while idler photons are collected by Bob and
Charlie. Charlie’s setup is identical to Bob’s. Positive and negative dispersion modules are used for the measurement of nonlocal
dispersion cancellation to estimate the eavesdropping fraction of the quantum channel between Alice and Bob (Charlie). EDFA:
erbium doped fiber amplifier; DWDM, dense wavelength division multiplexer; SNSPD, superconducting nanowire single photon
detector; TDC, time-to-digital converter.
exchange half of the records, i.e., frame and slot numbers
of photons, with each other through the classical secure
channel. After this stage, Alice holds the photon records
SA = (XA, Y A), where XA (Y A) corresponds to quan-
tum channel X (Y ) between Alice and Bob (Charlie).
Bob has the records SB = (XBkeep, Y
C
forward), where X
B
keep
are the records he keeps in the exchange and Y Cforward are
forwarded from Charlie. Similarly, Charlie’s records are
SC = (XBforward, Y
C
keep) where the former are from Bob
and the latter are kept by Charlie himself.
Next, we take the data block XBkeep as an example
to explain the messaging stage of 10-bit QDS by ghost
imaging. 10-bit message can be signed at a time since a
frame contains 10 slots in our setting. Fig. 5(a) presents
the distribution of Bob’s records XBkeep in each slot with
the single-photon measurement time of 2 s.The average
count of 〈XBkeep〉 is 561.93±7.26 and the error rate of slot
number between Alice and Bob is 3.78%±0.16%. For
signing the message 1000000000, Alice firstly randomly
chooses half the records from SA = (XA, Y A) and then
selects the records of which the slot numbers are all 1.
Thereafter, she sends the frame numbers of those records,
i.e., the signature elements Sigframe, to Bob. Finally,
Bob retrieves the message by ghost imaging of XBkeep and
Sigframe (Fig. 5(b)). Since Alice randomly discards half of
photon records at the beginning of the messaging stage,
the count in the first slot is 268.33±13.31, which is ap-
proximately the half of 〈XBkeep〉. Therefore, in the mes-
saging stage, if XBkeep(i) in the ith slot is not less than
〈XBkeep〉/2−σ, where σ =
√
〈XBkeep〉/2 is for the account of
Poisson fluctuation, the bit in this slot can be judged as 1.
If not, the bit is 0. In Fig. 5(b), the counts in other slots
are due to the system error rate between Alice’s records
with slot numbers of 1 and Bob’s records with slot num-
bers of 2 to 9. Fig. 5(c) is Bob’s image corresponding to
the message 0111111111. The count in the first slot is
10 due to the system error rate between Alice’s records
with slot numbers of 2 to 9 and Bob’s records with slot
numbers of 1. Here we define the noise factors in the slots
of bit 0 as f(XBkeep(i)) ≡ XBkeep(i)/(〈XBkeep〉/2), where i
6FIG. 5. (a) The distribution of Bob’s records XBkeep in each
slot after the distribution stage; Bob’s ghost images after Alice
signs (b) 1000000000, (c) 0111111111 and (d) 1010101010 in
the messaging stage.
is slot number. For the first slot of Fig. 5(c), the noise
factor f(XBkeep(1)) = 4.09%±0.59%, close to the system
error rate of 3.78%±0.16%. In real applications, the in-
creasing noise factor is attributed to the perturbation
by the eavesdropping in the distribution stage and the
malicious forging in the messaging stage. Actually, the
noise factor can be treated as the mismatch of signature
elements in the traditional QDS [15-23]. On the other
hand, Bob has an acceptance threshold ThBaccept. After
receiving the signature elements Sigframe, if all the noise
factors in each slot of the two ghost images (Sigframe and
XBkeep, Sigframe and Y
C
forward) are less than the thresh-
old ThBaccept, Bob will accept the message. The value of
ThBaccept should be slightly larger than the system error
rate. Furthermore, Bob forwards Sigframe to Charlie and
Charlie will also accept the message if the noise factors
are less than his threshold ThCverify. By this step, a 10-bit
QDS is realized. To prevent Alice’s repudiation, ThBaccept
is smaller than ThCverify, i.e., Charlie will certainly accept
the message if Bob accepts it. Fig. 5(d) is the case of the
signed message 1010101010.
Finally, the security level can be calculated in the 10-
bit QDS. As the noise factor can be treated as the mis-
match in previous QDS schemes, the security-level equa-
tions in Ref. [16] can be adopted in the multi-bit model
as:
Prob(Honest Abort) ≤ 2Exp[−(ThBaccept − e)2L]; (1a)
Prob(Repudiation) ≤ 2Exp[−(Th
C
verify − ThBaccept
2
)2L];
(1b)
Prob(Forge) ≤ Exp[−(Pe − ThCverify)2L]. (1c)
FIG. 6. (a) The security level ε versus Bob’s and Charlie’s
thresholds ( ThBaccept and Th
C
verify); (b) the optimized value
of ε versus the count L.
In the experiment, the system error rate e = 3.78% and
the average count in ghost imaging is L = 〈XBkeep〉/2 +
〈Y Cforward〉/2 with the count rate of 276 per second. Pe =
1 − χAC is Bob’s probability of incorrectly guessing the
slot numbers of Charlie’s records Y Ckeep when Bob wants
to forge the message. Here we set Pe = 0.447 for the
eavesdropping at the collective-attack level [35]. In gen-
eral, the security level ε, which means the failure possi-
bility of the protocol, is the maximum value of the three
possibilities described above. Fig. 6(a) displays ε versus
the Bob’s and Charlie’s thresholds when L = 552, cor-
responding to the measurement time of 2 s in the dis-
tribution stage. We can also obtain the dependence of
the optimized value ε on the count L in the ghost imag-
ing (Fig. 6(b)). For the QDS with typical security level of
10−4, L is taken as 939. Bob’s threshold ThBaccept is set as
0.1410 and Charlie’s threshold ThCverify is 0.3474. Hence,
we have the security level ε = 0.91 × 10−4. Therefore,
the three parties need to make the single photon mea-
surement for 4 s to control the failure probability below
10−4 in the 10-bit QDS.
V. DISCUSSION
It is worth giving a comparison between the proposed
mutli-bit QDS protocol and previous protocols when they
are applied to sign long massages. Previous QDS proto-
cols [15-23] focused on the single-bit signature. For a long
message in practical applications, it should be signed bit
by bit since these QDS protocols are based on the raw
keys generated by QKD for each bit. Compared to the
iteration procedure of the single-bit signature protocols
when they are applied on signing long messages, the pro-
posed multi-bit signature protocol has two characteris-
tics:
(a) Eliminating the impact of selective attacks, in
which one bit or a few specific bits in a multi-bit massage
are attacked.
When the single-bit QDS protocol is applied on sign-
ing a long massage, the key strings of one bit or a few
specific bits in the long massage may be attacked selec-
tively in the distribution stage of QDS. Hence, the length
7of the key string for these bits should be large enough in
order to guarantee its security. On the other hand, in-
vestigations have shown that the iteration procedure of
single-bit QDS protocols requires that the key strings
generated in the distribution stage for different bits in
the massage should be consumed by sequence to avoid
Bobs malicious forging, and the length of the key string
for each bit should be equal [39-41]. It can be seen that,
to avoid the selective attack on a specific bit, the key
strings for all the bits in a long massage should be long
enough, although most of them might not be attacked.
Hence, it reduces the efficiency of quantum sources, i.e.
the sources for the generation of raw key strings.
In the proposed multi-bit QDS protocol based on quan-
tum ghost imaging, the retrieve of the multi-bit message
is based on the data blocks from ghost-imaging detectors
at both sides. Since the photon pairs are generated ran-
domly in time domain, and arrival times of single photon
event recorded at Bob and Charlie are used to retrieve
all the bits of the long massage. Hence, the proposed
multi-bit QDS protocol eliminates the impact of selec-
tive attacks, in which one bit or a few specific bits in a
multi-bit massage are selectively attacked.
(b) Simplifying the security-check procedure.
When the single-bit QDS protocol is applied on sign-
ing a long massage, the key strings for each bit should be
carefully checked for security against eavesdropping. The
participants should check them one by one, and could not
use a global security-check parameter for the whole mas-
sage in the distribution stage to estimate the eavesdrop-
ping bound, since the semantic difference of the message
could be modified by forging a few bits or only one single
bit.
In the proposed multi-bit QDS protocol, the security
check in the distribution stage is global for the whole
massage. It can be used to estimate the attackers eaves-
dropping, since photon pairs contribute to each bit with
equal possibility and the protocol can avoid the selective
attack intrinsically. Hence, the security-check procedure
is obviously simplified by the proposed protocol in the
case of long massages.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a protocol of multi-bit QDS with a
proof-of-principle demonstration in which the 10-bit mes-
sage can be signed at a time. The message transmission
is actually based on the quantum temporal ghost imag-
ing, which is compatible with the security mechanism
of nonlocal dispersion cancellation in the large alphabet-
QKD scheme. In the distribution stage, the parties im-
plement the measurements of the entangled photon pairs
and store the classical measurement outcomes after the
security check of pairwise quantum channels and neces-
sary sifting on single photon events. In the messaging
stage, the recipients, Bob and Charlie, retrieve the mes-
sage by ghost imaging between their photon records and
the forwarded signature elements from Alice. Bob (Char-
lie) accepts (verifies) the message by checking whether
the noise factors in ghost images are below the acceptance
(verification) thresholds. In real applications, the noise
may due to the perturbation of the attacker’s eavesdrop-
ping in the distribution stage and the forging of the for-
warded signature elements in the messaging stage. The
noise factor in our scheme is similar to the mismatch of
raw-key sequence in traditional QDS and hence the secu-
rity level of multi-bit protocol can be calculated by the
approaches discussed in previous cases. In the experi-
ment, 10-bit QDS is implemented with the distribution
stage of 4 s and the security level of 10−4. The volume of
10 bit could be furthermore increased by suitably setting
the parameters in three-layer encoding mechanism, sim-
plifying the procedure of signing long messages in prac-
tical applications.
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